USA v. Antoine Waiters by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-25-2011 
USA v. Antoine Waiters 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Antoine Waiters" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 321. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/321 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2744 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
ANTOINE RANDALL WAITERS, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00014-001) 
District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 06, 2011 
 
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 25, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
Antoine Randall Waiters (“Waiters”) appeals from his conviction and 
sentence of 78 months‟ imprisonment, arguing that: (1) the District Court 
erroneously rejected his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) the enforcement of 
2 
 
the appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice; (3) the District Court 
committed procedural error, pursuant to the U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, in failing to adjust 
his applicable offense level downward; and (4) his request for a sentencing 
variance was improperly denied.  For the reasons expressed below, we will affirm 
the District Court‟s Order and sentence.1 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we set forth only 
the facts and history that are relevant to our conclusion.  In January 2006, the 
grand jury returned an indictment charging Waiters with one count of possession 
with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and one count of possession with intent to 
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860.  
Waiters began cooperating with the Government by participating in a series 
of proffer sessions.  The Government, then, offered Waiters a plea agreement 
wherein he would plead guilty to both counts of the indictment and serve as a 
cooperating witness.  In August 2007, Waiters pleaded guilty to the indictment 
subject to the written plea agreement, which specifically provided that: 
In exchange for the undertakings made by the government in 
entering his plea agreement, the defendant voluntarily waives all 
rights to appeal or collaterally attack the defendant‟s conviction, 
sentence, or any other matter relating to this prosecution, whether 
                                                 
1We have jurisdiction to recognize this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).  
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such a right to appeal or collateral attack arises under 18 U.S.C.       
§ 3742, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or any other provision 
of law.  This waiver is not intended to bar the assertion of 
constitutional claims that the relevant case law holds cannot be 
waived. 
 
Appellee‟s App. at 9.  Waiters reserved his right to file a direct appeal in only four 
limited circumstances, including: (1) if the Government appealed his sentence; (2) 
if his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense; (3) if the 
sentencing judge imposed an erroneously upward departure; or (4) if the imposed 
sentence was unreasonably higher than the Sentencing Guideline range. Id. at 9-
10. 
During a thorough plea colloquy, the District Court and counsel for the 
Government read pertinent parts of the plea agreement, including the entire waiver 
provision.  Waiters acknowledged, under oath, that he read the plea agreement, 
discussed it with his counsel, and that he had not been threatened or coerced into 
signing it.  The District Court, satisfied that it had been knowingly and voluntarily 
made, accepted Waiters‟s guilty plea.  Relying on the presentence report, the 
District Court ultimately determined that Waiters should be assigned an offense 
level of 28 and a criminal history category of I.  This range yielded an advisory 
sentence of 78 to 97 months.  The District Court sentenced Waiters to, inter alia, 
78 months‟ imprisonment. 
Waiters, then, stopped reporting to Pretrial Services and did not appear at 
his sentencing hearing scheduled on February 3, 2009.  After a fifth and final 
proffer session, Waiters‟s cooperation efforts ultimately failed because the 
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Government determined that he was not providing truthful and accurate 
information regarding his recent criminal activities.  As result, the Government 
declined to make a 5K1.1 motion on his behalf and refused to recommend a 
downward departure for acceptance of responsibility. 
On July 27, 2009, approximately two years after Waiters accepted the plea 
agreement and less than a month after he was charged with new drug crimes in a 
separate six-count indictment, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  After 
hearing oral arguments and conducting sentencing hearings over three days, the 
District Court denied the motion and sentenced Waiters to 78 months‟ 
imprisonment. 
This notice of appeal followed. 
II. 
An enforceable appellate waiver would preclude our exercise of jurisdiction 
over the instant appeal; therefore, we first address the appellate waiver provision 
in Waiters‟s plea agreement.  We exercise plenary review in determining whether 
Waiters‟s arguments on appeal are within the scope of the appellate waiver. 
United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 537 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).  
To determine if Waiters‟s appellate waiver bars this appeal, we consider:  
1) „whether a defendant‟s waiver of the right to appeal [his] sentence 
was knowing and voluntary;‟ (2) „whether one of the specific 
exceptions set forth in the [plea] agreement prevents the enforcement 
of the waiver;‟ . . . ; and (3) „whether enforcing the waiver would 
work a miscarriage of justice.‟    
 
Id. at 536 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
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A. Withdrawal of Plea 
We have held that a waiver of appeal, when entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily, is valid, unless a miscarriage of justice would result. See United States 
v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001).  Waiters first disputes that he 
entered into his plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily.  He alleges that his 
attorney promised that he would “cash his own ticket” and serve no jail time if he 
accepted the plea agreement.  He now argues, through new counsel, that he is 
innocent of both counts of the indictment and that he mistakenly entered the plea 
agreement relying on his attorney‟s recommendation. 
We find that this argument lacks merit.  Waiters acknowledged, during the 
plea colloquy, that his plea agreement contained “no additional promises, 
agreements or understandings other than those set forth in this written guilty plea 
agreement, and that no additional promises, agreements, or understandings will be 
entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.” Appellee‟s App. at 11.  A 
review of the record reveals that the judge‟s colloquy was comprehensive and 
satisfied the requirements of Rule 11(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  Waiters‟s consent to the agreement reflects a voluntary and knowing 
waiver of his rights.  His assertion of innocence is not credible and he has not 
persuasively explained why he took a contrary position under oath at the plea 
colloquy.  Because we find the District Court provided a firm basis on which to 
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uphold Waiters‟s acceptance of the plea agreement as knowing and voluntary, we 
will affirm the Order denying his motion to withdraw his plea. 
B. Miscarriage of Justice  
Waiters insists that enforcing the appellate waiver would work a 
miscarriage of justice.  To this end, he claims that defense counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file certain pretrial motions and for representing that Waiters would 
serve no jail time if he accepted the plea agreement.  Though in unusual 
circumstances an error amounting to a miscarriage of justice may invalidate an 
appellate waiver, the facts of this case do not present such a situation.  Courts have 
routinely deferred the issue of effectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack. 
See United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998).  In accordance, 
we will deny Waiters‟s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without 
prejudice.
2
  Nevertheless, we conclude that enforcement of Waiters‟s appellate 
waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice.  
C. Variance Request  
We next consider whether the District Court abused its discretion by not 
stating its reasons for rejecting Waiters‟s request for a sentencing variance.  
                                                 
2
 We note the Government in its brief stated that “it is apparent that the assertions 
of ineffectiveness would also fail as stand-alone ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.” Appellee‟s Br. at 42 n.5. The record, however, is not sufficient to allow 
determination of the issue. Therefore, Waiters‟s claim is dismissed without 
prejudice to his right to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a 
collateral proceeding. 
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Waiters received a sentence at the very bottom of the applicable sentencing 
guideline range.  Notwithstanding, he contends that the District Court should have 
considered the policy objections to the crack-cocaine disparity in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.
3
  Such a consideration falls within the discretion of the 
presiding judge.  We believe the District Court properly addressed the 
circumstances of the offense and considered Waiters‟s policy arguments.  
Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
imposed a within-guideline sentence.  
D. Sentencing 
Finally, Waiters argues that the District Court erred by refusing to grant 
him a downward adjustment, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, for acceptance of 
responsibility.  This argument lacks merit. His appellate waiver only preserved the 
right to appeal an upward departure.  Therefore, Waiters‟s appeal of his sentence 
falls within the scope of the appellate waiver and is precluded.  
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the Order and sentence 
imposed by the District Court. 
                                                 
3
 Whether Waiters is eligible for a reduced sentence, based on the retroactive 
application of the new crack-cocaine sentencing guidelines, is an issue properly 
addressed, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), to the District Court.  Waiters is not 
prejudiced should he wish to file a motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), 
requesting to have his sentence reduced. 
